The National Council for Human Rights – Syria is an independent, non-governmental
Strategic statement: “Geo-extortion broken.. Alternatives strategy and exposing Iranian piracy”
introduction: A call for international responsibility and condemnation of systematic terrorism
He condemns “the Council” In the strongest terms, the wave of treacherous terrorist attacks launched by Iranian forces and their arms against civilian and economic installations in the Arab Gulf states is seen as an escalation aimed at undermining international peace and security.. We place the international community, especially the United Nations Security Council, before its historical and legal responsibilities. Neutrality is in front “Arcade hacking” It legitimizes chaos. Disrupting the global energy artery is not a regional issue, but rather a blatant aggression that requires international deterrent action under Chapter Seven to protect freedom of navigation and ensure the stability of the global economy, which has become hostage to geopolitical bullying..
The first axis: Monitoring terrorist attacks and undermining illusions “Water dominance”
Firstly: Monitoring and documenting attacks “Corridor terror”
The period occurred between February and April/May 2026 An unprecedented hostile escalation that revealed the true face of the Iranian policy practiced “Strategic disconnect” Between soft diplomatic language and treacherous field action: Examples
• Targeting the UAE depth: The country was subjected to attacks that targeted civilian and vital facilities, including the launching of missiles “Mobile” And marches targeted a company “ADNOC” In the Strait of Hormuz and the petroleum industries areas in Fujairah.
• Assaults “Alba” and Bahraini establishments: The attacks focused on the economic infrastructure of the Kingdom of Bahrain, targeting a company “Aluminum Bahrain” (Alba) And oil facilities near Port Salman, all the way to areas near the capital, Manama.
• Iranian terrorism bill: These attacks caused painful human losses amounting to 13 death (10 civilians, 2 Military personnel and civilian contractors) And more than one injury 224 people, in addition to damage to a complex “Habshan” For gas and vital oil infrastructure.
secondly: Legal and political description of attacks
The Council confirms that the nature of these operations is outside the framework “Military confrontation” To be classified as “International piracy and bullying” According to the following data:
• Targeting international trade: Intentionally hitting oil tankers belonging to “ADNOC” As it transits the Strait of Hormuz, it is a direct threat to global energy security and not just a regional conflict.
• Duty “fait accompli” On the occupied islands: Through this escalation, Iran seeks to keep the UAE busy defending its facilities to reduce diplomatic and legal pressure aimed at reclaiming the three islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa).
• Hit economic gravity: Targeting successful models in the UAE and Bahrain aims to destabilize the stability that is the basic foundation of Gulf economic prosperity.
• Legal security of corridors (Invalidation of absolute sovereignty): The Council’s sound legal studies confirm the invalidity of Iran’s claims to impose its absolute sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (1982); Where the strait is classified as “International strait” It is used for international navigation, giving all ships the right “Transit traffic” Which the riparian states may not obstruct or suspend.
Third: Defense assessment and harvest of Iranian failure
Proven air defense systems (Like Thad and Patriot) High readiness and transformed the Iranian arsenal into numbers in the record of defensive success:
- In the United Arab Emirates:
• Ballistic missiles: Intercept and destroy more than 537 A missile.
• Drones: التعامل بنجاح مع حوالي 2,256 طائرة مسيرة.
• الصواريخ الجوالة (كروز): اعتراض 26 صاروخاً، دُمر معظمها فوق المياه الإقليمية. - في مملكة البحرين:
• إجمالي الاعتراضات: نجحت المنظومات الدفاعية في تدمير أكثر من 188 A missile and 468 A drone was targeting the Kingdom's territory.
• Latest developments (4 May 2026): اعتراض 8 Drones during the past hours, which confirms the continuity of defensive vigilance despite the enemy’s repeated attempts to penetrate.
The second axis: “Survival alternatives.. Breaking geographical restrictions and logistical sovereignty”
Firstly: Energy pipelines.. “Lifelines”
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have succeeded in building a land transport system capable of pumping approx 6.5 to 7 Millions of barrels per day (About a third of the oil passing through the strait) مباشرة إلى الأسواق العالمية: - خط “حبشان – الفجيرة” (أبوظبي): يمتد بطول 370 كم لينقل 1.5 One million barrels per day (تصل إلى 1.8 مليون في الطوارئ) مباشرة إلى بحر عمان، مما يضمن تصدير 60% من نفط الإمارات بعيداً عن هرمز ويحيد ورقة الابتزاز.
- خط “شرق – غرب” (Saudi Arabia): يمتد بطول 1200 كم ليربط حقول الشرق بميناء ينبع على البحر الأحمر، بسعة 5 Millions of barrels per day (قابلة للتوسعة إلى 7 ملايين)، بعيداً تماماً عن توترات الخليج العربي.
secondly: transformation “العبء الاستراتيجي” إلى المجتمع الدولي
إن تفعيل هذه البدائل أعاد رسم قواعد اللعبة الجيوسياسية:
• الصمود المالي: تضمن هذه الخطوط استمرارية التدفقات المالية والوفاء بالعقود الدولية، مما يمنع انهيار الميزانيات.
• توريط القوى الكبرى: عندما يغلق هرمز وتستمر “خراطيم النفط” الخليجية بالعمل، فإن المتضرر الأكبر هو المستهلك في الصين واليابان وأوروبا.
• المسؤولية الدولية: بموجب قرار مجلس الأمن الأخير، يتحول أمن المضيق إلى واجب قانوني دولي لحماية حرية الملاحة.
Third: التكامل الخليجي وحالات الدول
• البحرين: أمنها الطاقي مرتبط كلياً بالقدرة السعودية عبر أنابيب “أبقيق-الضهر”.
• عمان: تمتلك الميزة الجغرافية الأكبر بوقوع موانئها (الدقم وصلالة) خارج المضيق.
• قطر (العقدة الأصعب): تظل التحدي الأكبر لاعتماد صادراتها من الغاز المسال (LNG) بشكل كلي على الناقلات عبر هرمز، مع غياب خطوط أنابيب بديلة حالياً.
• دولة الكويت (تحدي الموقع العميق): تمتلك ارتباطاً برياً وثيقاً مع السعودية يتيح لها تأمين احتياجاتها عبر منفذ النويصيب، بالإضافة إلى مخزون طوارئ وصوامع تخزين هي الأقوى في المنطقة.
• تكامل المشهد (الدول الست): بإضافة الكويت، تكتمل خارطة الصمود؛ حيث تمثل السعودية والإمارات “قاطرتي التصدير”، وعمان “البوابة اللوجستية”، والبحرين العمق المرتبط تقنياً، والكويت العمق الشمالي البري، بينما تظل قطر العقدة التقنية التي تتطلب حلولاً ابتكارية.
• البدائل الإقليمية (الأردن ومصر): يبرز ميناء العقبة كمنفذ بديل لتغذية الخليج بالبضائع الأوروبية برياً، وقناة السويس كحلقة وصل لضمان تدفق الإمدادات للموانئ السعودية على البحر الأحمر.
Fourth: الميزة الجغرافية والربط السككي (سد الثغرات)
لا تتوقف استراتيجية الصمود عند النفط، بل تمتد لتأمين الغذاء والبضائع:
• عمان.. البوابة المفتوحة: تمثل موانئ عُمان عمقاً استراتيجياً طبيعياً يقع خارج المضيق.
• الأمن الغذائي والسلعي: يمثل تفعيل الربط السككي الخليجي والموانئ البرية صمام الأمان لضمان تدفق الواردات، مما يحيد قدرة الخصم على “تجويع” المنطقة.
The third axis: “أمن الإمداد”.. تحويل الحصار إلى انتحار سياسي للخصم
تراهن الاستراتيجية الإيرانية على أن إغلاق المضيق سيؤدي إلى “جوع أو إفلاس” دول الخليج لاعتمادها على استيراد 80-90% من غذائها، إلا أن البدائل اللوجستية تؤكد العكس.
Firstly: كسر “سلاح التجويع”.. المسارات البرية
• مسار سلطنة عمان: الشريان الأسرع حالياً لنقل البضائع من الدقم وصلالة للسعودية والإمارات.
• مسار الأردن – Saudi Arabia – دبي: يتيح نقل المنتجات الأوروبية من العقبة ومصر براً بكفاءة عالية.
• مشروعات الربط السككي: سيعمل قطار الخليج على تحويل الدقم وجدة إلى بوابات رئيسية تغذي كافة المنطقة.
secondly: تضرر المصدرين وتوريط “الغرب وآسيا”
• شبح الإفلاس الأوروبي: توقف الصادرات الأوروبية الضخمة للخليج سيعني إفلاس شركات كبرى وركوداً حاداً.
• تحالف الضرورة (الصين والغرب): سيجد المستهلكون الكبار أنفسهم في خندق واحد لإنقاذ اقتصاداتهم، مما يحول “البلطجة” الإيرانية إلى انتحار سياسي.
Third: الأبعاد الاستراتيجية
• سحب ورقة الابتزاز: إثبات أن “سلاح الابتزاز والبلطجة” لم يعد فعالاً، مما يضعف الموقف التفاوضي للخصم.
• طمأنة الأسواق: الحفاظ على التصنيف الائتماني وضمان استمرار التدفقات الاستثمارية.
• التوصيف الدولي: ترسيخ حقيقة أن إغلاق المضيق هو “قرصنة دولية” تستوجب تحركاً عسكرياً ودبلوماسياً.
Fourth axis: انحسار الأثر عن الخليج وتفاقمه عالمياً - نماذج المحاكاة الاقتصادية
تُظهر النتائج حول تأثر العواصم الكبرى ما يلي:
• بكين ونيودلهي (المستهلك الأكبر): ضغوط تضخمية حادة في الطاقة، مما يدفعهما للضغط على طهران لضمان أمن “البدائل” الخليجية.
• أوروبا (تضرر الصادرات): تكدس السلع الموجهة للخليج يهدد شركات التصدير بالإفلاس ما لم يتم تفعيل المسارات البرية عبر الأردن وعمان فوراً.
• صمود الخليج: بفضل “خطوط الصمود”، يحافظ الخليج على تدفقاته النقدية، وتتحول تكلفة الإغلاق إلى عبء عالمي يواجه إيران. - الأمن القانوني وبطلان الاحتكار
• بطلان الاحتكار الجغرافي: ادعاء السيادة المطلقة يتصادم مع حقوق الإمارات وعُمان في مياههما الإقليمية المتاخمة للمضيق، والتي تضمن مسارات سيادية بديلة تخرج عن التحكم الإيراني.
• التوصيف الدولي للانتهاكات: أي محاولة لإغلاق المضيق تُعد خرقاً جسيماً للمواثيق الأممية، مما يعطي الشرعية الكاملة للتدخل العسكري الدولي لحماية التجارة.
النتيجة النهائية
من خلال هذا التحليل، نثبت أن دول الخليج تمتلك اليوم “درعاً لوجستياً وقانونياً” يحول تهديدات الخصم إلى مجرد ضجيج إعلامي؛ فبينما تمتلك إيران “الجغرافيا الضيقة”، يمتلك الخليج العربي “البدائل الاستراتيجية” التي تضمن بقاءه كشريك لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه في استقرار الاقتصاد العالمي.
5 May 2026
Mr. Qutaiba Qasim Al-Arab
President of the National Council for Human Rights
Strategic Statement: “Breaking Geographical Blackmail: The Strategy of Alternatives and the Exposure of Iranian Piracy”
Introduction: A Call for International Responsibility and Condemnation of Systematic Terrorism
“The Council” condemns in the strongest possible terms the wave of treacherous terrorist attacks launched by Iranian forces and their proxies against civilian and economic facilities in the Arab Gulf states, viewing them as an escalation aimed at undermining international peace and security. We place the international community, specifically the United Nations Security Council, before its historical and legal responsibilities; neutrality in the face of “waterway piracy” is a legitimization of chaos. The disruption of the global energy lifeline is not a regional matter, but a blatant aggression that necessitates deterrent international action under Chapter VII to protect the freedom of navigation and ensure the stability of the global economy, which has become a hostage to geopolitical thuggery.
Pillar I: Monitoring Terrorist Attacks and Dismantling Illusions of “Maritime Hegemony”
First: Monitoring Attacks and Documenting “Waterway Terrorism”
The period between February and April/May 2026 witnessed an unprecedented hostile escalation, revealing the true face of Iranian policy, which practices “strategic schizophrenia” between soft diplomatic language and treacherous field action. Examples:
• Targeting the UAE Heartland: The state was subjected to attacks on civilian and vital facilities, including the launch of “cruise” missiles and drones targeting the “ADNOC” company in the Strait of Hormuz and petroleum industry areas in Fujairah.
• ALBA and Bahraini Facilities Attacks: Attacks focused on the economic infrastructure of the Kingdom of Bahrain, targeting “Aluminum Bahrain” (ALBA) and oil facilities near Mina Salman, reaching areas close to the capital, Manama.
• The Iranian Terrorism Bill: These attacks caused painful human losses amounting to 13 deaths (10 civilians, 2 military personnel, and a civilian contractor) and more than 224 injuries, in addition to damage to the “Habshan” gas complex and vital oil infrastructure.
Second: Legal and Political Characterization of the Attacks
The Council affirms that the nature of these operations transcends “military confrontation” to be classified as “international piracy and thuggery” based on the following:
• Targeting International Trade: Deliberately striking ADNOC oil tankers while passing through the Strait of Hormuz is a direct threat to global energy security, not just a regional conflict.
• Enforcing a “In fact” Status in Occupied Islands: Iran seeks through this escalation to distract the UAE with the defense of its facilities to reduce diplomatic and legal pressure aimed at reclaiming the three islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa).
• Striking Economic Attractiveness: Targeting the successful models in the UAE and Bahrain aims to shake the stability that serves as the primary pillar for Gulf economic prosperity.
• Legal Security of Waterways (Invalidity of Absolute Sovereignty): The Council’s rigorous legal studies confirm the invalidity of Iran’s claims of absolute sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982); the strait is classified as an “international strait” used for international navigation, granting all ships the right of “transit passage,” which coastal states may not impede or suspend.
Third: Defensive Assessment and the Harvest of Iranian Failure
Air defense systems (such as THAAD and Patriot) have proven high readiness, turning the Iranian arsenal into mere statistics in the record of defensive success:
- In the United Arab Emirates:
• Ballistic Missiles: Interception and destruction of more than 537 missiles.
• Drones: Successful engagement with approximately 2,256 drones.
• Cruise Missiles: Interception of 26 missiles, most destroyed over territorial waters. - In the Kingdom of Bahrain:
• Total Interceptions: Defensive systems succeeded in destroying more than 188 missiles and 468 drones targeting the Kingdom’s territory.
• Latest Developments (May 4, 2026): Interception of 8 drones in the past hours, confirming the continuity of defensive vigilance despite repeated breach attempts.
Pillar II: “Alternatives of Resilience: Breaking the Geographical Shackles and Logistical Sovereignty”
First: Energy Pipelines—The “Arteries of Life”
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have succeeded in building a land transport system capable of pumping approximately 6.5 to 7 million barrels per day (about one-third of the oil passing through the strait) directly to global markets: - Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline (Abu Dhabi): Extends 370 km to transport 1.5 million barrels per day (reaching 1.8 million in emergencies) directly to the Sea of Oman, ensuring the export of 60% of UAE oil away from Hormuz and neutralizing the blackmail card.
- East–West Pipeline (Saudi Arabia): Extends 1,200 km to connect eastern fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, with a capacity of 5 million barrels per day (expandable to 7 million), completely away from Gulf tensions.
Second: Shifting the “Strategic Burden” to the International Community
The activation of these alternatives has redrawn the rules of the geopolitical game:
• Financial Resilience: These lines ensure the continuity of financial flows and the fulfillment of international contracts, preventing budget collapses.
• Implicating Major Powers: When Hormuz is closed and Gulf “oil hoses” continue to operate, the most affected party is the consumer in China, Japan, and Europe.
• International Responsibility: Under the latest Security Council resolution, the security of the strait becomes an international legal duty to protect freedom of navigation.
Third: Gulf Integration and Individual State Cases
• Bahrain: Its energy security is entirely linked to Saudi capacity via the “Abqaiq-Dhahran” pipelines.
• Oman: Possesses the greatest geographical advantage, with its ports (Duqm and Salalah) located outside the strait.
• Qatar (The Most Difficult Knot): Remains the greatest challenge due to its total reliance on tankers through Hormuz for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports, lacking alternative pipelines at present.
• State of Kuwait (Deep Location Challenge): Possesses a close land connection with Saudi Arabia, allowing it to secure its needs through the Nuwaiseeb crossing, in addition to an emergency stockpile and storage silos that are the strongest in the region.
• Integration of the Scene (The Six States): With the addition of Kuwait, the map of resilience is complete; Saudi Arabia and the UAE represent the “export engines,” Oman the “logistical gateway,” Bahrain the “technically linked depth,” and Kuwait the “northern land depth,” while Qatar remains the technical knot requiring innovative solutions.
• Regional Alternatives (Jordan and Egypt): The Port of Aqaba emerges as an alternative gateway to feed the Gulf with European goods by land, and the Suez Canal as a link to ensure the flow of supplies to Saudi ports on the Red Sea.
Fourth: Geographical Advantage and Railway Linkage (Closing the Gaps)
The resilience strategy does not stop at oil; it extends to securing food and goods:
• Oman—The Open Gateway: Oman’s ports represent a natural strategic depth located outside the strait.
• Food and Commodity Security: Activating the Gulf Railway Link and dry ports represents a safety valve to ensure the flow of imports, neutralizing the adversary’s ability to “starve” the region.
Pillar III: “Supply Security: Turning the Blockade into Political Suicide for the Adversary”
The Iranian strategy bets that closing the strait will lead to the “starvation or bankruptcy” of Gulf states due to their reliance on importing 80-90% of their food; however, logistical alternatives prove the opposite.
First: Breaking the “Starvation Weapon”—Land Routes
• Sultanate of Oman Route: The fastest current artery for transporting goods from Duqm and Salalah to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• Jordan–Saudi Arabia–Dubai Route: Allows for the transport of European products from Aqaba and Egypt by land with high efficiency.
• Railway Projects: The Gulf Train will turn Duqm and Jeddah into main gateways feeding the entire region.
Second: Damage to Exporters and Implicating “the West and Asia”
• The Specter of European Bankruptcy: The cessation of massive European exports to the Gulf would mean the bankruptcy of major companies and a sharp recession.
• Alliance of Necessity (China and the West): Major consumers will find themselves in the same trench to save their economies, turning Iranian “thuggery” into political suicide.
Third: Strategic Dimensions
• Withdrawing the Blackmail Card: Proving that the “weapon of blackmail and thuggery” is no longer effective, weakening the adversary’s negotiating position.
• Reassuring Markets: Maintaining credit ratings and ensuring the continued flow of investment.
• International Characterization: Consolidating the fact that closing the strait is “international piracy” necessitating military and diplomatic action.
Pillar IV: Recession of Impact on the Gulf and Global Aggravation - Economic Simulation Models
Results regarding the impact on major capitals show the following:
• Beijing and New Delhi (Largest Consumers): Sharp inflationary pressures in energy, pushing them to pressure Tehran to ensure the security of Gulf “alternatives.”
• Europe (Damage to Exports): The accumulation of goods destined for the Gulf threatens export companies with bankruptcy unless land routes via Jordan and Oman are activated immediately.
• Gulf Resilience: Thanks to “resilience lines,” the Gulf maintains its cash flows, and the cost of the closure turns into a global burden facing Iran. - Legal Security and the Invalidity of Monopoly
• Invalidity of Geographical Monopoly: The claim of absolute sovereignty clashes with the rights of the UAE and Oman in their territorial waters adjacent to the strait, which ensure alternative sovereign paths outside Iranian control.
• International Characterization of Violations: Any attempt to close the strait is a grave violation of international covenants, granting full legitimacy for international military intervention to protect trade.
Final Result
Through this analysis, we prove that the Gulf states today possess a “logistical and legal shield” that turns the adversary’s threats into mere media noise. While Iran possesses the “narrow geography,” the Arab Gulf possesses the “strategic alternatives” that ensure its continued presence as an indispensable partner in the stability of the global economy.
May 5, 2026
Professor Qutaiba Qasim Al-Arab
President of the National Council for Human Rights
أمن الممرات المائية، مضيق هرمز، استراتيجية البدائل، القرصنة الإيرانية، أمن الطاقة العالمي، المجلس الوطني لحقوق الإنسان، خط أنابيب الفجيرة، الربط السككي الخليجي، السيادة اللوجستية، القانون الدولي للبحار.
Waterway Security, Strait of Hormuz, Alternative Strategies, Iranian Piracy, Global Energy Security, National Council for Human Rights, Fujairah Pipeline, Gulf Railway Link, Logistical Sovereignty, UNCLOS 1982.
